Seventh Army In France And Germany 1944 1945 Volume 1

Any effort to record a succession of many events, regardless of how closely these events may be related, can result only in a partial and incomplete history. Even though the writer adheres faithfully to the existing documents, contemporary to the events described, and eliminates errors of memory and bias on the part of individuals participating therein, gaps will be bridged. Available documents, such as plans and orders, may have been executed wholly, in part, or not at all. Plans and orders are but a means to the all important end execution. Under stress of a rapidly moving campaign, continuous and accurate evaluation of situations must be made as they arise, and success hinges on alertness and speed in exploiting an advantage or retrieving a disadvantage. In this control and direction of execution, it is but logical to expect that much of the action is initiated and often changed by decisions and orders transmitted orally on the spur of the moment, and of which no record is practicable. -- Throughout its campaign a small group of the Seventh Army Staff worked at scanning source material with the object of producing a continuous narrative. Upon leaving the Mediterranean Theater and coming under the Supreme Allied Headquarters, the narrative history was for some months subordinated to the production of small unit action reports brief factual reports involving regiments, battalions and companies. While such reports are invaluable for study in the Service Schools, it was realized that they do not afford a substitute for narrative, at Army level, and work on the narrative history was continued. It is not the object of this history to enhance either the reputation of the Seventh Army or of any individuals in that Army. It is being published to provide a record of the campaigns of that Army, as accurate and unbiased as possible, and not omitting inevitable mistakes and difficulties that may have occurred. Emphasis has been placed on the tactics of the campaign, supply being less thoroughly covered, although there are chapters on supply for each phase of the book. Absence of more detail regarding supply must not be inter- preted as a lack of appreciation of its importance. Never was a campaign so dependent on supply for success. To say that the functioning of the supply agencies, under supervision of the G-4 Section, was less than brilliant would be an error. The obstacles overcome by them, at times, seemed insurmountable but were never accepted as such. Since an account of action can be followed accurately only by having both text and maps simultaneously visible to the reader, maps have been arranged so as to provide that convenience. To fill in some of the gaps in the record and to prevent erroneous conjecture on the part of the reader, the following facts should be remembered: 1. In the landing on the shores of South France tactical surprise was attained as a result of careful planning, including numerous diversionary operations. Therefore the Seventh Army attained the desired goal — a landing with a minimum of opposition. 2. Rapid exploitation to the north from the beachhead was no accident. Based on the mission and experience learned in landings previous to this one, it had been determined during the planning phase that the force would exploit rapidly out of the bridgehead and up the Rhone to contact American forces landed in Normandy just as quickly as opportunity offered. 3. A policy of unremitting pressure to keep the enemy off balance was maintained throughout the campaign, even during the temporary partial stalemate in the Vosges.

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